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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH

8NARR ADVERTISING, INC.,
a corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE

l~TAH

STATE TAX

Case No.

10808

CO~I

~IISSlON,

Defendant.

BRIEF O·F DEFENDANT
STA'J1EMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action is before this honorable court on a writ
of certiorari to review a decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission.
The soh• issue presented to the court is whether or
not a sales tax may be appropriately imposed upon receipts from advertising upon outdoor painted billboards
and adwrtising signs.
1

DISPOSITION BEFOHE THE
UTAH STATE rrAX CO~IMISSION
After consideration of all pertinent facts and the
law, the Utah State Tax Commission on October 25, 196(),
rendered a decision (R. 204-206) sustaining the deficiency
assessment (R. 111-198) against Snarr Advertising, Inc.
The existing controversy between Snarr Advertising,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Snarr) and the Utah
State Tax Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
Commission), which arose out of the deficiency assessment above referred to, involves a number of collateral
problems, some of which are related and some not, in
addition to the question raised on this appeal. Many
of these have been satisfactorily resolved in the interim;
the resolution of others is dependent upon the decision in
this case.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commission's decision of October 25, 1966, above referred to.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As correctly pointed out in plaintiff's brief, there is
no substantial controversy as to the facts, but there is
considerable difference in the interpretation of these
facts. The question presented to the court for its determination is admittedly complex and sophisticated, and
may require some venturing into uncharted waters. Be2

C'aUS<~ of this, and betau::;e the nature of the court's
d(·ei:sion depends in a large part on how these facts
arP inteqJl'ded, it is pertinent that they be accurately
~d forth at the outset.

Plaintiff'::; brief includes an eight-page summary
of tltt>se facts as ::;et forth in the record. This summary
is accurate in most particulars. Because of the tendency
(perhaps unavoidable) in such an extended narration
of and eomrnentary on the facts toward some selective
n'porting, special pleading and other interpretive practiees which might more appropriately have been included
in the argument section of the brief, it seems desirable
to srnrnnarize in this brief also the basic facts as they
are relevant to this review.
Snarr Advertising, Inc. advertises for its clientele
upon painted billboards. These billboards are built, prepan•d and painted by Snarr, sometimes based on suggestions from a particular customer or its advertising
agPncy, but more often based on original work by Snarr
approv0d by the customer. (R. 55-58, 66, 77) The land
npon which a billboard is placed upon completion may
lwlong to either the advertising agency or the client, but
ty1Jically belongs to neither of these, but to a third party
with whom Snarr has entered into a lease for a term
ePrtain. Snarr may move a given sign from one location
to another with a comparable exposure factor if the
elient approves such a move. (R. 41-42)
It i::; important to note at the outset that Snarr places
vainted billboards exclusively in this jurisdiction. (R. 64)
Tlwse are custom-made for a given client and erected

3

for a long period, usually three or four years. ( R. 81)
rrhis is a considerably different factual situation than
that existing in relation to standard si'.Ze postc>r billboards
npon which the advertising matter is changed every
few weeks. The witness from Snarr Advertising, Inc.,
.Mr. Moon, offered no specific testimony as to what percentage of the materials going into these billboards is
ever reused, but the long life of the sign, the practices of
the business, the specially designed custom shapes of
many of the signs and other factors suggest that a small
percentage indeed of the materials is reused in the work
of another customer once they are put into a billboard
(R. 82).
The standard agreement forms used by Snarr in its
dealings, both with its clients and with lessors of land,
were introduced into evidence and are part of the record.
(R. 199-203) ThesP are t~Tiical of similar contracts used
by others in the industry. An examination of these documents will reveal that by their terms Snan r<>tains C('l'tain rights in and responsibilities for the billboards
and that the client obtains certain rights in and responsibilities for the billboards. What some of these are, and
their legal significance, will be explored in the body of
this brief.
Also in the record (R. 10-12) is a stipulation of facts
entered into between the parties, setting forth in some
detail the nature and history of this action.
Those parts of the record which are excerpted and
commented on in plaintiff's brief on pages 5-9 will also
be dealt with in the argument section of this brief.
4

::)ome olrnervations would seem appropriate in rchtion to th<' d<>ei,.,ion of the Commission, which is subjected
to somt' buffetings on pages 9-10 and 18-20 of plaintiff's
11rief. lt is respectfully submitted that the findings of
fad and conclusions of law set forth in the Commission's
deeision are entirely adequate, and are amply supported
hy the record and each other. It is true that some of
the conclusions of law are really mixed questions of lm','
and fact, since they express the Commission's determination as to the ultimate facts of this controversy, and
frame these in the applicable statutory language. In
this intricate problem a clean delineation between law and
fact is neither possible nor desirable, and while it is
obvious that some of these conclusions of law might have
bPPn repeated verbatim or with minute modification in
the findings of fact section, it is submitted that little
ronstructlon would have been accomplished thereby; and
further, that the Commission's findings and conclusions
an_. altop:Ptlter appropriate and sufficient. See Meeker v.
l.rhigh Valley R. R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 35 Sup.Ct. 328,
G2 L.Ed. G-±4 (1915).
As is stated in the standard work on the subject,
Prof. Davis' definite AdminiBtrative Law Treatise, Vol.
'.!, ~ lG.OG (1958):
Courts do not want agencies to include detailed
of tPstimony in tlwir findings, they
\\-ant -wlrnt th<>Y call the basic facts. The ultimate
finding may l;e and nsnally is mixed with ideas
of law or policy. Tlw Suprenw Court has said:
''ThP ultimatP finding is a conclusion of law or
at l<'ast a delineation of a mixed question of law
and fact." H elcninq r. Tr.r-Pem1 Oil Co., 300 U.S.
-!-81, -191, 52 S. Ct. 569, 574, 81 L.Ed. 755 ( 1937).
~urnmariPs

5

Some jurisdictions by statute impo:,;e express burdens on administrative agencies to 111ake particular findings, or to issue their findings in a particular format.
Ptah is not such a jurisdiction.
Nor is it a jurisdiction that restricts narrowly the
scope of review of the Supreme Court of decisions of
administrative agencies. Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-1-l:
( 1963) specifically states (as noted on page 18 of plaintiff's brief) that "the decision of the Tax Commission
may be reviewed both upon the la\\' and upon the facts."
This does not disturb or negate the function of the 'I1ax
Commission as a finder of facts, whose findings will not
be lightly overturned. As stated in M cf( e11drick v. State
Tax Comm'11., 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P. 2d 177 (19-19):
On the hasis of tlw fignr<'s al1un' discussed the
Commission concluded that tlw plaintiff's bnsi1wss
is essentially that of s<>lling iwn;onal pro1wrty,
and regarded the ]Jersonal :,;<·rvie<'s rernlPrPd as
merely ineidental tlwreto. Notwithstanding the
fact the statute providing for review by this court
of decisions of the tax commission allows it to be
made "both upon the law and the facts,'' we
nevertheless allow eonsiderahle latitudP to tlw determination mad(e b~T tlw 'rax Commission and do
not disturb it unh•ss it is dt-arly enoneous. Western Leather & Fi11di11q Co. v. State Tax Comm'11,
87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526.
This is, however, a quite different climate than that
found when the review court is bound by and cannot
overturn factual findings made by a given administrative
body, as is true with some federal agenci<>s.
6

The instant ease is unlike those where appellate
eourts havP had to remit a record to a commission for
more detailed, more precise or better organized findings.
Those have typically been cases where a specific statutory
bnrden is imposed or where the record is so extensive
as to impose an unconscionable burden upon a reviewing
tribunal in determining whether or not the record supports the decision of the agency.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision is in
every particular adequate and that the record, albeit
snbjeet to a number of interpretations, supports the Commission's decision. While plaintiff suggests that the
Commission erred or was at least less than thorough in
that it "did not list its reasons, its theories or its interpretations or analyses of the facts" in its formal decision,
we would stress that theories, interpretations, analyses,
etc. involve argument as well as facts and law, and should
not he included in a formal decision of the type utilized
by the Commission disguised as pure fact or law, but
would be most appropriately presented to a reviewing
court in the body of a brief, as will be the case in this
controversy.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PAINTED BILLBOARDS INVOLVED IN THIS
CONTROVERSY ARE TANGIBLE PERS 0 NA L
PROPERTY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF UT AH
CODE ANN.§ 59-15-2(g) (1963).

Utah CodE~ Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) (1963), the statute
uncfor whirh liability is asserted, provides as follows:
vVhen right to continuous posst>ssion or use of
any article of tangible personal property is

7

granted under a lease or eontract and such transfer of possession would he taxahle if an outright
sale ·were made, such lease or contract shall he
considered the sale of such article and the tax
shall be computed and paid by the vendor or
lessor upon the rentals paid.
The kind of statute of which this is a prototype had
its origin primarily in a legislative reaction against the
practice, at one time extensive, of using leases and similar
agreements as a means of excise tax avoidance. Many
states now have statutory provisions purporting to accomplish the same thing as Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g)
( 1963), but the language of these statutes and the manner
in which courts have interpreted them vary considerably
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This plurality of evolution divests cases from other states construing these
statutes of some of the persuasive value they might
otherwise have.
Since our statute requires the right to continuous
possession or the right to continuous use of tangible
personal property as a condition of tax imposition, it
'lvould be appropriate to initially determine whether or
not tangible personal property is involved within the
purview of this language. Plaintiff, while conceding the
obvious, that the painted billboards involved are tangible
personal property, has taken the position that since it
considers, and its customers consider, its business to be
that of furnishing a service rather than that of marketing
personalty, the fact that the billboards are tangible personal property is not significant since the service is
non-taxable and the proprrties furnished to plaintiff's
clients are simply incidental to such service.
8

One of the most frequently litigated of sales tax
qnestions is that concerning the appropriateness for tax
imposition of a transaction involving both a service and
property. The volume of suits in this area is not surprising, since almost every service rendered involves the
transfer or use of some tangible property and almost
every sale of property involves directly or indirectly
some service or other value not inherent in the substance
itself added by a service.
Even in the fields where an apparently pure "service'' is involved, such as those of a broker, clergyman,
lawyer, minister, analyst, or travel agent, the rendering
of the service very often involves the transfer of use of
some property, albeit usually of nominal value. On the
other extreme, even the outright sale of a commodity
in a retail merchandising establishment almost always
involveti some service, and not just that of sales personnel but often those of accountants, deliverymen, packagers, and (almost without exception) fabricators of
the article sold from its constituent substances. In bet ween these examples are many in which the value and
importance of the service rendered and of the commodity
furnished are relatively equal.
Some administrators and courts have attempted to
solve the dilemma of which of these transactions should
he and which should not be subject to excise tax imposition by attempting to prorate the relative values of the
commodity and the service involved. A far more rational
approach, however, is that reflected in the case of 111 cl\ endrick v. State Tax Comm'n, supra. The question
9

there presented was whether a sales tax applies to sales
of artificial limbs. The court held the sale of such limbs
taxable, against the contention that the material included
in these prosthetic devices was of nominal value when
compared with the worth of the work and :service that
went into their preparation, under the theory that "by
far the greater part of the skill and labor in creating
artificial limbs is done prior to the sale, so that it has
then acquired the value created by such skill and labor."
Chief Justice J. Allan Crockett, speaking for the court,
elaborated upon this principle in the following language,
particularly apropos to the instant controversy:

It is quit<> gt>rn•rall:v tnw that "uiatniab, '' considered separate and apart frorn "s(•rvicPst are
not worth much. The value of raw materials
depend:s upon their abundance or scan·it~-. It is
usually very small in comparison to thP procluds
into which tlH>y are fashioned. It is the taking
of ore from the mine or the tree from the forest
and fabricating them into something useful which
makes the end product desirahlP and therefore
valuable. During the process of transformation
through various stage's tlw vahw is sh•adily enhanced in proportion to the ex1wncliture of time,
energy and :skill then-'on. An PXCPll<·nt if somPwhat exaggprafod exam11le of this is the process
by which a pound of ore, worth hut a frw cents,
is mined, smelted, processed, h•mpered and fabricated into hair springs for watdws ·worth thousands of dollars pPr pound. \Ylwn onP is sold its
value is that of the finished product and not of
the basic materials from which it was made. While
less marked in dPgn•p the smrn• principle applies
to the plaintiff's product.
... the exact allocation of the cost of lahor and
materials is not controlling. It i:s the synthesis
10

of both in the finished product which determines
its sales value.
The p1'inciple here elucidated should govern in this case.
In the final analysis, whatever ''service" Snarr renders
to its customers goes into the painted billboards and
whatever value such services might have are absorbed by
and exist only in relation to the billboards. The service
is not rendered in a vacuum, nor at all apart from the
tangible property involved. Without a billboard there is
no value received for which the client could be billed.
This principle might be further illustrated by examination of a restaurant operation. A breakdown of the
vrice of a meal to determine what part of the price
covt:'red the foodstuffs themselves and what part reflected such "serviees" as procuring the food, cooking
and preparation, serving the meal, cleaning and maintenance, managing the establishment, etc., would almost inv:wiably show that these latter charges account for the
major portion of the charge to the customer. Particularly
would this be true in more exclusive, higher priced establishments. It could not be suggested however, that beeause of the fact that these "services" represent the lion's
8hare of the price, that such services rather than the
JH'oduct is really what the customer is paying for or
that the meal is furnished incidental to the "services"
or that a sales tax on the whole charge for the meal would
he inappropriate. Whatever value these services have are
absorbed into the final product; i.e., the served meal, and
the services have no value whatever to the customer
separate and apart from this meal.
11

At the risk of redundancy and in hope of bringing
the point into yet clearer focus, we offer an even more
extreme example. If X purchases from Y, a licensed
art dealer, an original Cezanne landscape for $250,000,
would it not verge upon the absurd for X to point out
that the canvas, paint and other substances which make
up the painting are really worth only $8.35, the balance
representing "artistic services" (plaintiff's brief, page
33), and that, therefore, he should pay a sales tax upon
only $8.35, if at all~
Other examples were cited during the course of the
proceedings before the Tax Commission of products
whose fair market value is so much in excess of the
market value of the separate components of such product as to have no apparent relation whatsoever. Plaintiff has promised on page 33 of his brief that many
of these hypotheticals will be employed in this brief
and we would, therefore, be hesitant to omit them.
Some of these products (there are many others as well)
are drugs, phonograph records, patented equipment,
antiques, cosmetics, rare stamps and coins, and first
edition books. If any of these items were sold there can
be no doubt that an excise tax would be appropriately
imposed upon the full consideration furnished.
Another example of this concept, and one from a
case which we respectfully submit as controlling, is found
in Young Electric Sign Co. v. State Tax Cormn'n, 4 Utah
2d 242, 291 P. 2d 900 (1955), to which extensive reference
will be subsequently made. Young Electric Sign Com-
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pany entered into two types of contracts with its customers. In one type of transaction, called "repair sales,"
Young simply repaired electric signs already in the posS(·ssion of its customers and incident to such repair
furnished tangible personal property amounting to about
six percent of the total repair bill. The court held sales
tax imposition inappropriate. It might be noted in passing that subsequent to the Y oimg Electric Sign case the
Legislature (in 1959) enacted Utah Code Ann. § 59-154 ( e), which would probably lead to a contrary holding
should the same matter be brought before the court at
this time; this point is, however, peripheral to our present
mqmry.
In the other transactions the company prepared neon
signs, which it installed according to its agreements with
its clients. These signs usually identified the business
premises in question. This fact cannot, however, be
ascertained from reading the opinion and we would suggest that it is not legally significant whether identification or advertising is involved. These rental contracts
included a charge for maintenance. There is no precise
breakdown on the percentages of materials and service
values involved in the case; the statement in plaintiff's
brief (page 31) that the percentage of materials was
fifty percent defines the outside limit; the language of
the case is "over fifty percent of the receipts is for
service and maintenance." Young Electric Sign Co. v.
State Tax Comm 'n, supra. The court upheld a sales tax
imposition on the entire value of these rental contracts,
saying that "what elements enter into charges for these
nmtals can be of no materiality."
13

Plaintiff makes a valiant attempt to explain away
this language; we would submit, however, that it means
what it says, and that what it says is the same thing
as the McKendrick case, the court's most recent utterance on the subject, says.
Another case which has been important in the evolution of this law in Utah is the case of liVestern Leather
& Finding Co. v. State T.a·x Conini'n, 87 Utah 227, 48
P. 2d 526 ( 1935). In this case the eourt held that the
wearer of shoes which had been repaired is the ultimate
consumer of these repaired shoes, and that a sales tax
appropriately lies on the full cost of the repairs which
included about thirty percent materials value and seventy
percent labor and service charge. The force of this case
is somewhat mitigated, however, by ambiguities therein
and by the fact that its basic concern was ·with wholesaleretail distinctions and the questions of ultimate consumer
and its consideration of the problem before the court
now only tangental.
Cases from other jurisdictions support the M cK en.drick doctrine. Particularly interesting is the California
case of Bigsby v. Johnson, 99 P. 2d 268 (Cal. 1940),
·which involved the sales of printers mats and composition, and in which the costs of skills and services account
for over ninety percent of the charge made to clients.
The court found a sales tax on the full charge appropriate, citing the case of Cus'ick v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky.
204, 84 S. W. 2d 14 ( 1935), for the proposition that "the
chief value of many articles consists in the cost of the
service and the skill by which tlwy are produced rather
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than the cost of materials out of which they are made."
The Cusick case involved a number of custom-made
items of merchandise. In People ex rel Walker Engrav1119 Co. v. Groves, 243 App. Div. 652, 276 N.Y.S. 67±,
Aff. 268 N.Y. 6-18, 198 N.1£. 539 (1935), a sales tax was
upheld upon the full cost of photo engravings when the
worth of component materials came to less than two
iwreent of tlw total charge. A similar result was reached
in relation to the preparation and sale of films in District
of Columuia v. Norwood, 336 F. 2d 7-16 (1964). State
1'aJ,' Comm'n v. Hopkins, 234 Ala. 556, 176 So. 210 (1937),
which relied upon Western Leather & Finding Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, supra, involved eye glasses which
were sold for an amount five times the value of comvonrn t materials. Determining a sales tax imposition
appropriate on the total charge, the court said that "the
test a::; to the application and validity of the tax in such
eas('s is not the relative value of the materials and serviees, but the nature and character of the process, activiti e::;, or manufacture required or employed."
On pages 32 and 33 of its brief, plaintiff attempts
to distinguish the instant case from the McKendrick case.
\Y l~ "·oul<l suggest that these purported distinctions are
fragile indeed, and that part of page 33 wherein it is
suggested (if we interpret the text correctly) that the
artistic concept, locating of the billboard, maintenance of
th0 billboard and lighting are severable from and not
represented in the value of the finished product, or do
not "C'nhance" the structure, particularly tenuous.
Another dimension of this problem presents itself,
the question of whether or not a charge may be broken
15

down and a tax applied only to the value of the product
a.s opposed to the value of the service. Courts have sometimes allowed this type of segregation where the customers have been billed separately for the materials and
services, particularly when each of these could be purchased independently, but where, as in the Young Electric
Sign case, the vendor has for purpose seeming to him
good and sufficient not broken down the billing, such
a proration has been consistently disallowed. In the instant case, even though evidence has been introduced purporting to show the value of the tangible parts of the
structure to be about fifteen percent of the total charge
to the customer (R. 72), the customer receives no segregated invoice showing that proration.
In a separate opinion in the Y.oung Electric Sign
case, Chief Justice J. Allan Crockett incisively illustrates
the pitfalls of proration without an actual breakdown in
the billing to the customer. When a single charge is made
for both materials and services, and they are never
separately sold, what, in fact, is the charge to the customers for the materials 1 Surely the vendor cannot simply
pass on his charge; he is entitled to a profit on the
materials ... but how much of a profit 1 To attempt to
figure out prorations and breakdowns for sales tax imposition in situations of this type would be to open a
Pandora's box, and the consistent refusal of tax administrators and courts to get involved in this type of thing
is understandable.
The particular contracts (called "agrePments'') here
involved off er no breakdown of costs, and, indeed, no
J6

l'(•frn•nce to salc~s services, artistic services, etc., but
speak simply of preparation of "outdoor advertising
displays.'' The agreements are written in a neuter terminology, and words which carry legal connotations which
rn ight be helvful to resolution of this problem, such aR
"~ale," '·lease," and "service" have been carefully
avoided.
Of particular interest in the evidence presented (R.
85-86) are statements which establish that a client of
Snarr will be charged an identical amount whether or not
lw furnishes the original advertising idea or even pre] irninary sketches of the display. \Ve would respectfully
suggest that this fact is less than consistent with plaintiff's claim that one of the most valuable services it performs, and one for which its customers are billed, is in the
area of advertising idea formulation and conceptualization ("arfo;tic service"). If the price to the client is identical whether or not these services are rendered, the precision of plaintiff's cost analysis is suspect. It is obvious
that the amount paid by a customer is greatly in excess of
the cost of the component materials, but this cuts both
ways since "the sign itself was paid for during the term
of tlw agreement" (plaintiff's brief, page 30), which gives
tlie transaction the earmarks of an actual sale.
In consistently referring to those with whom it does
business as "clients" rather than "customers" Snarr
attempts to connote a service rather than a sales relationship. ·we suggest that this is a semantic game,
altering in no particular the realities of the transactions.
Tn Utah Atty. Gen. Op. No. 58-044, May 28, 1958, the
Attorn('Y General of the State of Utah examined a prob-
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lem closely akin to the instant questions and ruled that
·where a product has both a tangible and an intangible
value, a sales tax upon the total price of the product
must lie.
The conclusion herein urged, that the painted billboards are tangible property, and that if a tax is due
at all it is due upon the total charge, is consistent with
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-2( d) (1963), in the complementary Use Tax Act, which states that " 'Sales price'
means the total cash sum for which tangible personal
property is sold, including any services that are a part
of the sale . ... " (Emphasis added.)
In that part of the statement of facts in plaintiff's
brief entitled "the nature of the plaintiff's business" and
in Point III argument is advanced that since what the
clients of Snarr really pay for are exposure of their
product and since this exposure or value is comparable
no matter what particular type of advertising media is
used, the tax consequences of the use of the various
advertising media must of necessity be similar or even
identical.
We would submit that this suggestion is fallacious
because the tax is imposed not upon coverage or exposure
but upon the right to continuous possession or use of an
article of tangible personal property which might be
enjoyed by a person in connection with such coverage or
exposure.
By way of analogy, suppose a person of considerable
means had invested in the following in an attempt to
increase his capital:
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1. Tax exempt municipal bonds issued by the

City Commission of Omaha, Nebraska;

2. Five thousand shan's of common stock of
Polaroid Company;
3. Valuable original paintings of Dega and
::\Tiro;

-+. Two duplexes in Denvt'r, Colorado, leased to
two families on short term leases;

5. A number of second mortgages on homes in a
subdivision in ,Jefferson City, Missouri;
G. Partnership in a hardware store in \Vaukegan, Illinois;
7. Unmounted sapphires, emeralds and diamonds;
8. Unpatented uranium mining claims located in
San Juan County, State of Utah, operated
by an agent;
9. A copyright on a popular novel;
10. Unimproved realty in the Yukon.
It is obvious that even though the purpose of all
these investments is identical - to effect a financial
appreciation or gain in net worth - the ad valorem,
income and excise tax ramifications of the investments
would vary enormously.

The same principle is applicable here. The mere
fact that a client might derive substantially the same
benefit, in terms of professional jargon, from the use
of such media as newsprint, billboards, bumper stickers,
and the airwaves does not necessarily imply the existence,
or even the desirability, of a unitary taxing scheme upon
all such uses. The evidence introduced supports this
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proposition, since it was admitted by plaintiff's witnesses
(R. 58-60) that certain articles used in novelty or "gimmick'' advertising are proper subjects for sales or use
tax imposition, even though their use brings a comparable
exposure benefit to that which would be realized through
another device or approach, such as a radio commercial,
which clearly would not be subject to taxation. Of necessity, there will be an enormous variance in tax consequences resulting from use of different media, and these
differences would be factors in the selection by agency
and customer of one medium over another.
That there are significant differences between TV
and radio advertising, periodical advertising, and billboards is apparent. Newspapers go out by the hundreds
all over the valley, and any assertion of a right of possession or use over a whole edition would be suspect.
lT se of the airwaves need not directly involve tangible
personal property at all. Only a billboard exists at a
given and identifiable point in time and space, with the
possibility of a continuous exercise of possession or control over it, or of a continuous use of it.
We would, therefore, suggest that all parts of plaintiff's brief which dwell upon advertising concepts and
terminology, interesting and informative though they
may be, are hardly relevant to this inquiry. It is not the
advertising service or end upon which the tax is being
proposed, but the means employed to attain such an
end. If in providing advertising for its clientele, plaintiff enters into an agreement by which there is created
a right to possession or use in a client that is within the
20

imrview of Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) (1963) a sales
tax will appropriately lie; if not, no tax will lie.
Plaintiff urges that were this tribunal to sustain
the decision of the Commission an unconscionable discrirnina ti on within the industry would follow. vVe would
suggest that this is not necessarily so, and further that
an adoption of plaintiff's position would itself result
in a somewhat insidious discrimination. Suppose X and
Y each buy or lease a billboard, X for advertising and Y
for some other purpose. Plaintiff's position would result
in taxing Y and not X, even though their purchases were
identical. This would result in an abandonment of the
traditional statutory test of the nature of the transaction
and substitute for it one where taxation or non-taxation
would depend upon the purchaser's subjective intention
as to possible subsequent use of the property.
Nor does the fact that a product might be worth
more at one time than another time, or in one place than
another, necessarily argue for special sales tax treatment.
1ndeed, this is not uncommon in typical retail operation;
the price of a product is affected continually by such
factors as supply and demand, season, distance of retail
outlets from source, etc.
It is in the above frame of reference that Sales Tax
Hegulation No. 65 must be examined, which provides in
pertinent part as follows:

Adwrtising space sold in newspapers, magazines
or otherwist' is not subject to tax. Likewise,
charges made hy advertising agencies for preparing and placing advertising media are charges for
service, and, therefore, are not taxable.
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Plaintiff has urged that the inclusion of the phntsP
''or otherwise" in this language brings billboard advertising within the purview of the regulation. vVe respectfully
submit that under accepted principles of statutory construction, which are applicable to regulatory language as
'vell, a narrower inte11)retation is clearly to be pref e1Ted.
Applicable is the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which
provides that where general words follow an enumeration
of specific words, the general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be interpreted
as applying only to that type of persons or things specifically mentioned in the preceding particular enumeration. Goldsmith v. United States, 42 F. 2d 133 (2d Cir.
1930). Since newspapers and magazines are here specifically listed, the proper interpretation of the sentence
would be to limit the exemption to periodicals. Snarr's
reference in its brief (page 17) to the "cryptic" doctrine
of ejusdem gcneris suggests dissatisfaction with the doctrine per se and does not negate its logical and obvious
appropriateness to the regulatory language above quoted.
Other ramifications of the regulatory language above
set forth will be explored in Point III of this brief.

POJS'l' II
THE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN SN ARR ADVERTISING, INC. AND ITS CUSTOMERS CREATE IN
THESE CUSTOMERS A TAXABLE RIGHT OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION AND A TAXABLE RIGHT
OF CONTINUOUS USE UNDER THE TERMS OF
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 59-15-2(g) (196~i).

In the first point of this brief that part of the language of Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) (1963) dealing
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with tangible personal property was explored. In this
point the remainder of the statutory language of that
provision will be examined.
It should be stressed that incidence of tax imposed
by Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(g) (1963) falls upon the
right of possession or use granted by the lease or contract, rather than upon any actual possession or use. If
the agreement entered into grants to the lessee the
right to possess or use certain tangible personal property,
it is irrelevant and academic to inquire as to what degree
:such right was exercised, if, indeed, it was exercised at
all. It was unnecessary for the Commission, therefore, to
look behind the contracts entered into by Snarr to determine the extent of the user or non-user of the tangible
personal property involved.

The phrase "continuous possession or use" is of
obvious significance in this statute, since any attempted
imposition of tax thereunder will succeed only when a
party has either the right to continuous possession or (in
the alternative) the right to continuous use. Although the
phrase appears to be less than precise, sufficient judicial
construction has been given it and its component words
to give it an explicit and intelligible meaning.
Antonelli v. Board of Commissioners, City of Newark, 128 N.J.L. 531, 27 Atl. 2d 12 (1942), adopted the
Funk and \Vagnalls Co. dictionary definition of continuous as "connected, extended or prolonged without separation or interruption of sequence, unbroken and uninterrupted and intermittent." In Hode v. Sanford, 101 F.
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2d 290 (5th Cir. 1939), continuous is defined as "without
break, cessation or interruption." Otlwr cases have similar definitions. See T7. S. c. Fit.q)((tricl.-, G~ F. 2d 5G2
(10th Cir. 1933) and Kinna 1.:. Norton, 102 S. 2d 653
(Fla. App. 1958). By regulation, the State of Kansas,
which has identical statutory language [~ 69-3602(1)
Kansas Statutes Annotated 196-1] has defowd continuous possession in a manner that is particularly helpful
in a statutory context substantially identical to our own:
"continuous possession is deemed to be that possession
which is uninterrupted for the period of the oral or
written contract.''
In Pa1nhandle & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Hoffman, 250 S.W.
246 (Tex. 1923), continuous possession was held synonymous with "unbroken" possession. A similar result was
reached in Hitchens v. Milner Land, Coal & Toi~msite Co.,
65 Colo. 597, 178 Pac. 575 (1919), where a party was held
to have "continuous" possession of a water right even
though he used it only certain months of the year.
The principal difficulty with this type of statutory
language is one of time - how long an uninterrupted
use should be required to justify tax imposition~ Such
terms as "prolonged" and "extended" suggested by plaintiff at the hearing help little since they are vague and
imprecise and derive their meaning only from context.
For example, an 11-hour s1wech would be a prolonged
speech, but an 11-hour war ·would not be a prolonged war.
Similarly, if a person held his breath for 3 minutes, he
would hold it for an extended period, but a walk of a 3minute duration would not be an extended walk. Thus, it is
impossible to pin down from the statutory language an
24

exact time that a lessee must have the right of continuous
possession or use of a particular property. Often, however, a reasonable time period is implied, and courts have
refused to impose liability under statutes similar to ours
when short term leases were involved. The leading case
reflecting this approach is Herbertsen v. Cruse, 115 Colo.
27-1, 170 P. 2d 531, 172 A.L.R. 1312 (194G), which is particularly helpful because the Colorado statute is identical
to that of this jurisdiction. See also U-Drive-Em Service
Co. v. State, 205 Ark. 501, 169 S.W. 2d 584 (1943), and
lliontgornery Aviation v. State of Alabama, 154 So. 2d
2~l (Ala. 1963). The Herbertsen and U-Drive-Em cases
involved automobile rentals, while the Montgomery case
involved airplane leases under a statute at substantial
variance with our own.
There is an excellent guideline as to a time requirement in Utah in the Young Electric Sign case, where this
tribunal had no difficulty in determining that a threeyear lease was of sufficient duration to impose liability.
Since the leases entered into by Snarr are for a comparable period, we respectfully submit that the time requirement in the instant case should create no problem,
and that if the court finds a right to possession or use,
then such possession or use is clearly "continuous."

Is there a possession in the lessee in the instant
situation? Some of the incidents of ownership, such as
the right to remove or replace the sign, clearly remain in
the lessor. Others, such as the right to require change in
the copy, and aU of the benefits of the billboard, accrue
to the lessee. His product or service, and solely his prod-
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net or service, is brought to the attention of the public.
The property is being used not only in his interest but
also to a large degree at his direction. Other rights are
in a third party, the fee owner of the realty in question.
vVe would suggest that the rights, interests and obligations existing in the lessee in the instant situation are
not dissimilar in nature or markedly less in degree than
in some of the classic "sales in disguise" cases.
It is clear that one can "possess" property with rights
of ownership, use and dominion and still recognize rights
in others in relation to the property possessed. Examples: one may possess an automobile or an appliance
which is subject to repossession; one may possess a herd
of cattle subject to control and regulation by the Agri('Ulture Department; one may possess realty and recognize in others mineral rights or easements in such realty.
Similarly, one may possess a painted billboard, but recognize the responsibility in others to maintain and care for
it and the right in others to move or replace it.

In addition to actual possession, there is a type of
possession known as constructive possession. This exists
"\vhen a person lacks physical possession of a piece of
property, but has control over and use of the property
to the degree that he may be said to have "possession of
the property for all intents and purposes, even though
physical possession be in another." Baragiano v. Villani,
117 Ill. App. 372 (190-1,): Brown u. Folkening, 64 N.Y.
76 (1876). In The Ocemrn, 233 Fed. 139 (D.C.N.Y. 1916),
possession is simply defined as the 1·i~ht to enJOY the
liroperty.
26

Snarr's brief places considerable emphasis upon the
understanding of the billboard lessees that they acquire
no possessory or proprietary interest through the contracts. It is true that the understanding of the parties
might be extremely significant should litigation develop
between such parties in relation to such an agreement,
or should a third party assert some right or privilege
under the terms of the agreement, but the subjective opinions of the parties are not of cardinal significance in a
determination of asserted tax liability as against a sovereign who is neither a party to the contract nor, in any
real sense, a third party beneficiary. ~What is significant,
and what the court must ascertain, is the actual relationship existing between the parties and the actual rights
they have in the property concerned - the objective facts
m: they exist, even if inconsistent with the understanding
of the parties as to those facts. Particularly is this true
if this "understanding" would benefit the parties at the
(·xpense of another not privy to the agreement.
It is true that in contracts parties may use words
in just about any sense they see fit, and some interpretation of contracts have been sustained which seem exceedingly bizarre when it has been properly shown that
the interpretation upheld was that intended by the parties. However, these cannot be used to the detriment of
a party not privy, particularly a soverign asserting tax

liability.
The reference to horses and cows on page 15 of
plaintiff's brief refers to an example, admittedly reductio ad absurdum, which was offered to illustrate the
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prnposition abon" set forth at the hearing before the
Commission. If jurisdiction X had a transfer tax on
rows but not on horses, and in this jurisdiction A and B
entered into an agreement by which a cow was sold,
A and B could not avoid the transfer tax on cows by
agreeing in writing that the animal being sold was in
fact a horse. A court would look behind the written word
and examine the realities of the transaction, and disregard when necessary the partisan assertions of those
who would profit materially from a given interpretation.
Similarly, in the instant case any interpretation of the
agreements here pertinent by individuals in the advertising field must be looked at with a keen awareness of the
fact that they are not disinterested parties above the
battle, but stand to gain directly and extensively by a
ruling against tax imposition in the instant case. It is
not an adverse reflection on either the integrity or intelligence of these witnesses, but merely a comment on their
humanity, to suggest respectfully that their testimony,
and particularly that part which could be considered
expressions of an opinion rather than recitations of fact,
must be to a certain extent discounted. The Commission
listened to the testimony in the record, considered it
carefully and at great length, and determined in its
capacity as a finder of fact that the clients of Snarr
have the right to continuous possession of the billboards
in question. We submit that this determination was equitable, reasonable, according to law and should be affirmed.
Also relevant here is the principle of law that contracts in which the public interest is involved shall he
construed in that manner most favorable to the sovereign
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and the public. McCullough i:. Board of Park Commissioners of Minneapolis, 157 Minn. 278, 195 N.\V. 1013
(1923); Larson v. South Dakota, 49 Sup. Ct. 196, 278
U.S. ±29, 73 L.Ed. 441 (1929).
A little more difficult to deal with than the word
"possession" in this statute is the word "use" because of
the paucity of judicial construction of it. There is some
language that would be instructive in relation to its
meaning and context, however. For example, Bryson v.
Hicks, 78 Ind. App. 111, 134 N.E. 874 (1922) ruled that
if one has use of a thing, one enjoys, holds, or occupies
it in some manner or has a benefit from it. Use has also
been defined as "usefulness, utility, advantage, productive of benefit." National Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W.Va.
420, 121 S.E. 291, 36 A.L.R. 1171 (1924).

Counsel for plaintiff in his brief (page 17) attempts
to simply read the word "use" out of the statute, relying
upon the New York case of Howitt 1 Street & Smith
Publications, 276 N.Y. 345, 12 N.E. 435 (1938). This case
involved short term leasing of certain paintings for duplication under a statute with language differing significantly from our own. The court, in a narrow holding,
confined to the facts of the case and contrary to an
existing regulation, ruled that no tax was due. The opinion states that "taxing statutes must be given a practical
construction," and the language in the case strongly suggests that this practical approach was resorted to in
order to avoid what the justices apparently (and probably
correctly) felt would have been an undesirable result.
~We would submit that the Howitt case, based upon neither
1•
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imrticularly good law nor particularly good logic, cannot
have any persuasive value before this court.
One of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that effect must be given to every word and phrase
in a statute, and that nothing is meaningless or without
effect. 2 Sutherland, Statidory Construction, 3d Ed.,
§ 4705 (1943). There is an abundance of case law in this
jurisdiction supporting this proposition. Stevenson v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 7 Utah 2d 28, 317 P. 2d 341 (1957);
State v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 36-1 P. 2d 1019 (1961);
vValker Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 23-l F.Supp. 7+
(1964); Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P. 2d
984 ( 1965). "Use,'' therefore, does not mean the same
as "posse;:;;sion'' in the statute, but presents an alternate
way in which its requirements might be met.
Thus, \Ve respectfully suggest that where the right
to continuous use over a substantial period of time is
gained by a lessee under lease or contract, a sales tax
may be applied to such lease or contract according to the
~tatutory language. One of the witnesses for plaintiff
at the hearing, Mr. Joseph S. Francom, said (R. 54) that
the companies "leased the privilege to use " the billboards
"for three or four years." If the court finds that l\lr.
:B'rancom's representation is accurate, the statutory requirements are met.
At the risk of being redundant we note once more
at this juncture that the court need not sustain the finding
of the Commission that Snarr's clients had a right to
continuous possession and the finding that these custo30

rners had a right to continuous use, since, in the alternative, either would be sufficient to create tax liability.
Both are present, however.
A somewhat troublesome phrase in Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-15-2(g) (1963) is that which reads "such transfer
of possession.'' This language seemingly demands an.
antecedent, yet there is no antecedent, no mention in the
statutes of a transfer to which it could refer back. There
is some judicial authority to the effect that where possession is involved there must be a "transfer" of such posSf'ssion before a tax may lie. It should be noted, however,
that the transfer need not be a physical handover akin to
livery of seisen. An exchange of papers or even a verbal
act is often sufficient to accomplish such a transfer;
actual physical possession may not even he a significant
factor. See Browne v. Case, Pomeroy & Co., 47 N.Y.S. 2d
547, 267 App. Div. 496 (19-14); Lehman v. Cameron, 139
N.Y.S. 2d 812, 207 Misc. 919 (1955).
The point of transfer of po session m the instant
ease would be that point at which a billboard was erected
and its utilization for the exclusive benefit of the customer in question began. This would be the proper moment
for tax imposition.
In the context of a "right'' to use rather than a
"right" to possess, the phrase "such transfer of possession" presents a particularly difficult interpretive problem. Since we have determined that the requirements of
the statute may be met by a contractual right to use the
property as \vell as a contractual right to possess the
property, this phrase might be properly read "transfer
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of possL'ssion or use., or "transfer of possession or commencement of use." Or it might be interpreted to define
the moment of proper imposition when a pussessory
right is to be taxed. Further insight into the ''transfor"
requirellwnt in a context of use i·athPr than possession
comes from the use tax law equivalent of Utah Code Ann.
~ 59-15-2(g) (1963), which is Utah Code Ann.~ 59-16-2(k)
(1963):
\Vhen the right to eontinnons 1>ossession or use
of an artiele of tangible personal i>ro1wrty is
granted undL'r a lf•asP or contraet, such lease or
contract shall be considf•recl thP storaw', use or
other consumption of such article and the tax
shall be computed and paid upon the rentals pai(l.
The absenct> of a requin•rnent of a transfrr in this
provision suggests that where a taxable right of use
is involved, no transfer requirement exists. Bolstering
this conclusion are the holdings of our court to the effect
that our sales and use tax ach; are in pari materia and
that tht> prnvisions of one appl~- to the other as well.
See Barrett Ini:cstnient Co. 1). State Tax Cornm'n, 15
Utah 2d 97, 387 P. 2d 998 (19G-1-).
Refert'nce to Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-16-2(k) (19G3)
opens another interesting dimension of this problem.
Our use tax law contains an exemption for transaction;.;
subject to a Utah sales ta.._ [rtah Code Ann.~ 59-1G-4(d)
(1963)]. If the court should find that ewry n•quirement
of Utah Code Ann.~ 59-15-2(g) (19G:3) is met except that
of a "transfer of i>ossession" and that the transactions
are therefore not subject to a sales tax, rTtah Code Ann.
~ 59-16--1-(d) (19G3) would lw inapplicable. Use tax li-
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ability would lie under the terms of Utah Code Ann.
~ 59-16-2(k) (1963).
Another phrase in Utah Code Ann.§ 59-15-2(g) (1963)
meriting our consideration reads "would be taxable if an
outright sale were made." In consideration of this requirement, a question should be sufficient: If Snarr had
sold outright to a client a painted billboard, would a sales
tax lie upon the full price of such sale~ We would submit
that the answer to this question is so obviously affirmative as to require no further discussion or exploration.
The final clause of Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(g)
( 1963) sets forth unequivocally that the amounts of
rentals paid to the lessor shall be the basis of the excise
tax imposed. This, in addition to defining the rate of
tax, argues against the proration between materials and
services where no breakdown is made in the agreements
between Snarr and its clients.
Courts throughout the country in construing statutory language related to (but sometimes distinguishable
from) Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(g) (1963) have arrived
at diverse conclusions. One of the most oft-cited cases
in this area, and one which was explored at some length
in plaintiff's brief, is Universal Engineering Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, 256 P. 2d 1059 (Cal. 1953). This
case is the source of the influential "substantial consumption" test. It involved rock bits used in drilling, and held
that when these bits had been used by the lessee in such
manner and to such extent that they were not fit for
reuse, a sales tax was appropriately applied. If this
concept were to be applied in the instant context, it is
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respectfully uTged that a tax woul<l usually lie, since
the signs are custom-made, often cut in unusual designs,
and used for the exclusive benefit of a single customer
for a period of several years. Testimony was introduced
to the effect that parts of signs were on orcasion reused,
even though the witness was not able to offer any meaningful estimate as to the amounts reused.

'yere

the court to adopt this test or something akin
thereto dt~tailed factual determinations might have to be
made by the advertising agenri<>s to determine which
parts of the billboards \\'ere in fact used in more than
one display. It seems clear that any materials used
solely in the display of one client for his lwnefit and not
reused at the end of the period of the lease agreement
are "substantially consumed'' during the course of the
lease transaction.
Another case r01ied upon by plaintiff is Federal Sign
& Signal Corp. v. Bowers, 174 N.E. 2d 91 (Ohio 1961).
This would seem on initial impression to he of particular
usefulness since it involves billboanl ]Pases. EvPn though
the factual situations are in fact similar, it is respeetfnll)"
submitted that the case is readily distinguishable on the
basis of law. The Ohio statntf•, as poinkd out on ]lRges
22-23 of plaintiff's brief, requires transfer of possession
or title, whc•reas the Utah provision is concerned solely
with a lease or contract which creates the right to possession or use. We would, thus, respectfully suggest that
the difference in statutory language involved is of such
significance that the case loses whatever 1wrsuasive foree
the factual similarities appear to give it.
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Other cases not previously mentioned herein or in
plaintiff's brief in which tax imposition was upheld are
Recording Devices, Inc. v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 518,
190 N.E. 2d 258 (1963) "\vhich involved time lock rentals;
Poston Equip. Corp. v. Bowers, 171 N.E. 2d 725 (Ohio
1959) which dealt with construction equipment; Philadelphia Assoc. Linen Supply v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa.
Supr. 560, 12 Atl. 2d 789 (19-±0) in which a tax was
imposed on linen rentals. Contra: Fe.derhofer Inc. v.
Morris, 364 S.W. 2d 523 (Mo. 1963) involving vehicle
rentals and IBM v. State Tax Comm'n, 362 S.W. 2d 635
(::\fo. 1962) dealing with the lease of business machines.
Pursuit of the case law and literature in this field
leads to two conclusions: ( 1) There is such variance
in the statutory language from state to state that both
the cases holding both for and against imposition are,
as previously pointed out, limited in the persuasive value
they have; and (2) with the passage of time there is an
increasingly broader imposition of ta.-x. in situations which
seem to have little relationship to the classic "sales in
disguise" or "lease in lieu of sale" situation in which
this type of statute had its birth.
-we now invite the court's attention to the most significant judicial precedent, the case of Y owng Electric
Sign Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, supra. Young Electric
Sign Company (hereinafter referred to as "Young")
entered into agreements under the terms of which neon
signs were furnished to clients at a fixed monthly rental
for an extended period. The worth of the materials in
such signs came to something less than fifty percent of
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tbe rental under the terms of the agreements. This comt
found in the clients of Young the right to possession or
use of these neon signs, even though formal title to them
remained in Young and even though Young was obligated
under terms of the contracts to perfonn maintenance and
repair services on these signs. 'Vhile there was some
variance between the language in the agreements involved
in the Young case and those herein involved, it is respectfully submitted that the two transactions are substantially identical. The court said after reciting the facts
(most of which were stipulated) and quoting Utah Code
Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) (1963):
This statute is not amhiguous. It is not controverted that the transfer of poss<•ssion of the signs
under the rental contracts here involved are such
that if outright salt's were made they 'rnuld he
taxable under this section. In suf'h event the
plain wording of the statute requires the taxes
to be computed npon tlw rentals paid. What elPments enter into the charges for these rentals can
be of no materialit_\'. .f Utah 2d 20G, 291 P. 2d 902.
The similarity of the two cases, and the remarkable
similarity between the arguments raised by Young and
those now being urged upon the eonrt by Snarr, is illustrated in this language from the opinion:
Plaintiffs argue that from these stipulations it
appean; that although tlW_\' used a rental agreement form in their re-writes, thP.\- in faet werp
not renting personal property in such re-writes
the "possession of which wonld be taxable if an
outright sale were made>," but WPr<' actually selling
service and maintenance contraets and that the
same was true of tlH~ charges for tlw options.
While it is true that in detern1ining these rentals
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and option prices the plaintiffs did not charge for
the value of the sign, nevertheless they retained
the title to the sign and were still renting it to
the customer ... The material fact is that there
is transferred the right to continuous possession
of personal property the possession of which
under a contract or lease would be taxable if an
outright sale ·were made, and as we pointed out
in the case of the original rental agreements, it is
the charges for these agreements which are taxable and not the various elements which enter
into the determination of these charges. -± l~tah 2d
206, 291 P. 2d 903.
It is true that the present problem represents an
extension of the Young holding. ·we would respectfully
submit, however, that it is not an unwarranted extension,
but one which follows logically and inevitably from the
thrust of the Young opinion. The similarities between
the two situations are far more numerous and far more
significant than the differences between them. These
latter include agreement nomenclature, the utilization of
the signs in the Young case for both identification and
advertising purposes, and the usual location of the signs
in the Young case on or near the business premises of
the customer. There has been considerable previous comment about the significance of agreement nomenclature
as opposed to transaction substance. There would appear
to be no significant difference within the purview of the
statutory language in the use or benefit received by a
client between having his place of business identified or
in having his product advertised, if indeed this type
of precise distinction can be made. This leaves the question of the locations of the signs. On page 21 of its
brief, Snarr suggests (raising the point for the first
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time on this appeal) that a trespass might be here involved were the client to even go to his sign. VVe would
respectfully submit that even if this is true that it does
not go to the substance of the type of the right to possession or use contemplated by the Legislature, and further that the requirement is still met, even though less
obviously than in the Y oun,q case. This is particularly
true in view of the Commission's finding that plaintiff's
clients possessed the right of continuous use of the structures involved.

POINT III
THE TRANSACTIONS ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
SNARR ADVERTISING, INC. AND ITS CUSTOl\IERS
ARE WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE LIMITS OF
SALES TAX IMPOSITION, AND THE TAX WAS
PROPERLY IMPOSED.

The first two points of this brief consist of an analysis of Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2 ( g) (1963). This third
and final point is in the nature of a miscellany; herein,
an attempt to respond to arguments made in plaintiff's
brief outside of the gamut of the statutory language will
be made, and the problem will be explored in a somewhat
broader frame of reference.
Plaintiff has placed considerable reliance on the
fact that only in recent years has the Tax Commission
attempted to assert that billboard rentals were appropriate subjects for taxation. This would appear to be
true, and the stipulation itself contains the statement that
there is no evidence that anv such assertion was made
prior to August 1963. There are a number of possible
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explanations, such as a change in industry practice, the
discovery by Tax Commission officials and auditors of
taxes which should have been paid, and, most significantly, the Young Electric Sign decision. Certainly there
is no suggestion in the record that the Commission ever
vrior to this time made a specific determination that
sales tax was not due upon the right of possession or use
of painted billboards. It might be well argued that these
proceedings result not from the change in position, but
rather the initial taking of a position in an attempt on
the part of the Commission to secure a more thorough
and equitable enforcement of the law. The record shows
a prior Commission position neither consistent nor inconsistent with its present stand; it simply shows no prior
position at all.
I£ven if the court finds that the Commission has been
wrong in its failure to more diligently enforce this provision of the law in this factual context, no estoppel or
prohibition against imposition at this point is created.
This principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed by this
court, most recently in the case of Union Pacific R.R. Co.
v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah,-------- Utah 2d ________ , -------p. 2d -·-····· ( 1967). The court therein stated :
The plaintiff makes another argument to which
we dirE>ct our attention. It says that for 22 years
the defendant Tax Commission has interpreted the
statute so as to exempt railroads from paying a
sales or use tax on its fuel oil used in propelling
its engines and that many legislatures have been
convened during that period of time, but never
once has a bill been introduced to change the
statute as so interpreted. The general law is found
in 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Section 358, at page 759:
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On the vrintiple of eontc•n111o:·anr•nn~: <·xpo8ition,
eomrnon usage and lll'adi<'e nml•·r t1H• statnh-, or
a eom·se of comlnct ind iea tinµ; n l H: ·\-i en] a 1· understanding of it, will frpqnc•ntJ,· 1w of' gl'eat vahw
in determining its real mea11i11µ;, <'S]J(·cialJ:,' '.d1en
thl' usage has heen a('qni<·~:eed in h~" all part ie:-:
coneerned, and has Pxtenc1ed over a long period
of time. A praetical construction of a statute is
not conclusive on the courts, hut, if unvarying
for a long period of time, it should be disregarded
only for the most cog·ent reasons. rrhe doctrine
arises only from a course of conduct, and is nev<'r
applied to a single case. l\f oreover, no matter lww
long the usage has bel'n Pstabllslwd, or how general the acquiescence in the customary eonstl'll('tion, it will not be permitted to override the plain
meaning of a statute: nor will the rule of practical construction apply where the ambiguity is
merely captious and not serious enough to raisP
a reasonable doubt in a fair mind reflecting
honestly on the sub;ject.
One of the many earlier cases standing for the same
proposition, and one which states it ·with particular terseness, is E. C. Olson Co. v. State Tax Cmnm'n, 109 Utah
563, 168 P. 2d 324 ( 1946). '11he eourt nokd:
vVe find no merit in the plaintiff's contention
that the Tax Commission is precluded from colleeting the tax defieieney heeausc' of Commission
auditor's oral statements that the sal0s were not
subjeet to the tax and b0eause the C01mnission
has not attempted to eollect same for over 1:2
years .
. . . Nor is it shown that the Commission aetnally
knew taxes ·wen>. not being paid on said sales
and so could he said to havt> acqnieseed in t]JI'
non-collection thereof.
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... lt will not be seriously contended that because the Tax Commission has for so many years
omitted to assess and collect the tax on the questioned sales it is now precluded from performing
that duty and from salvaging from its past omissions what it can for the state.

Plaintiff's memorandum. cites two regulations of the
State Ta."'\: Commission which are germane to the instant
problem. Sales Tax Regulation No. 32 is excerpted in
plaintiff's brief hut for convenient reference the relevant
portion is here reprinted in full:
Sales or use tax shall be computed by the lessor
on rentals received pursuant to rental or lease
agreements which are made in lieu of outright
sales. In cases where the lessor is not registered
with the tax commission to collect use tax, the tax
must be paid directly to the tax commission by
the lessee of the tangible personal property.
Tax on receipts from leases and rentals applies
when the lessee has the right to use and operate
the tangible personal property. ·where the lessor
has a renting and leasing business and he purchases tangible personal property for rental or
lease purposes, he should issue his vendor a resale
certificate because, in this category, the tax is
applicable only on the rentals charged and not
on the cost of the property to the lessor.
Sales Tax Regulation No. G5 is quoted in pertinent
part on page 16 of plaintiff's brief.
It is urged by plaintiff that these regulations are
not completely ronsistent with the stand now taken by
the Commission.

Sales Tax Regulation No. 32 rephrases slightly the
statutory language but does not, nor indeed cannot, mod-
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ify its meaning in any pai·ticular. 'Chat part going beyond
the statutory language deals primarily with the mechanics
of computation and collection.
Sales Tax Regulation No. 65 is not applicable to
painted billboards for the reasons pointed out in Point I
of this brief. The artwork reforred to is artwork created
in the office of the advertising agency for visualization
and selection purposes, rather than a finalized IJainted
billboard to be placed before the public.
In case the court does determine, however, that
these regulations are not consistent with statutory law,
it is axiomatic that the statutes and not the regulation
must control. A regulation must be interpreted in a
manner consistent ·with the statute upon which it is based
to have any validity; if irreconcilable with that statuh•,
it may simply be ignored. In Olson Construction Co. L
State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P. 2d 1112 (1961),
the Utah Supreme Court said of a regulation which had
been promulgated and later withdrawn by the State Tax
Commission:
The regulation went hP)rond penuissihle lilllits of
administrative intc~rprdation since it would, on
the facts of this case, nullify tlw applieahle statntory definitions of the terms ''r<-'tail salt>" and
"retailer" and would grant an exem1)tion ·where
the statutes grant none. This court, while n'cognizing the possibility that one might lw pe1rnliz('d
by reliance upon an invalid administrative regulation, has held that an administrativP intPqn·c,tation out of harmon)r nnd contrary to th(' t'xpn:ss
provisions of a statute eannot lw givPn weight and,
to do so, would in effect amend that statute.
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On pages 28-29 of its brief, Snarr points out that
some tax has been paid upon the materials utilized in
these billboards. It suggests that to now impose a tax
upon the finished product would amount to double ta.xati on necessitating a refund. If the court's decision is
that the position of the Tax Commission is sound, this
claim would seem meritorious and an appropriate refund
would be forthwith tendered. This would appear to be a
red herring, however, since the tax paid by plaintiff's
own calculation amounts to only about five percent of
the total deficiency assessment. Further, plaintiff has
not yet petitioned the Commission for a refund of such
tax, but is in fact raising this argument for the first
point at thiR stage of the proceedings. If the decision
of this court, or an equitable extension of this decision,
requires a refund or credit, this should present no problem.
Finally, plaintiff notes on page 17 of its brief the
maxim that ambiguous tax measures should be construed
strictly against the taxing authority. In addition to making the assumption (expressly contradicted in the Young
decision) that the statute herein involved is ambiguous,
this fails to state the principle of law that a party
;;:eeking exemption from a revenue statute of general imposition has the burden to show that he is entitled
thereto and that statutes of this type must be construed
against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power.
Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679, 24 L.Ed. 558, 560
(1878), Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 Pac. 1097
(1897); Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272;
12 A.L.R. 552 (1920). Both of these maxims have in the
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past somewhat regrettably been utilized as convenient
pegs for courts to hang de>cisions on ,,-hi<'h hav<:'. usnall~;
been made on other bases altogether, but both are nonetheless valid statements of the law. "Which, if either, is
here appropriate will depend upon the court's interpretation of the particular facts involved. At least one case,
Recording Devices, Inc. v. Bowers, supra, stands for the
proposition that the presumption favors the State and
the burden is on the taxpayer.
CONCLUSION
Snarr Advertising, Inc. is engaged m the business
of preparing painted billboards containing advertising
matter which are erected on various sites for the benefit
of its customers whose goods or services are being advertised. There are no poster billboards, which may present
different legal considerations, involved in this proceedmg.
These billboards are tangible personal property
within the purview of Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g)
(1963). The Commission determination on this point was
based upon and is in c0mplete aceord with the ruling of
this court in the case of M cK cndrick v. State Tax
Comm'n, supra.
The Utah State Tax Commission in its capacity as a
finder of fact, after a long and careful consideration of
the evidence presented before it, determined that the
customers of Snarr obtained under the documents herein
involved the right to continuous possl'Ssion of th(•se hill-
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boards according to the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 5915-2 ( g) ( 1963).
The Commission also determined that the clients
of Snarr obtained the right of continuous use of these
billboards.
The statutory requirement for tax imposition is in
tlie alternative and to affirm the Commission's decision
the court need find only that either the right to continuous possession or the right to continuous use existed
in these customers of Snarr.
The evidence also indicates an actual continuous
possession and an actual continuous use of the properties
involved by the customers of Snarr; however, the existence of such possession or use is not a statutory requirement.
It is respectfully submitted that the remainder of the
requirements of the statute are also met, and that if an
outright sale of the billboards were made the transaction
would be taxable. This being the case, the statutory
language is explicit that tax shall be computed and paid
by the vendor or lessor upon the amount of these rentals.

If the court finds all of the requirements of the
statute met, except that relating to a transfer of possession (if appropriate), the transactions are within the
purview of Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-2(k) (1963), and
subject to the Utah use tax.
It is respectfully urged that the fact situation in this
('ase is in substance identical to that in the case of Young
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P.:lcctric Sign Co., supra, and that case constitntt•s a compelling and controlling precedent for taxation.
The questions presented in this case are significant
and will have an effect upon the outdoor advertising
industry in this State however resolvt•<l h:- the tourt.
The decision of the Commission was fair, equitable and
in accordance with applicable Utah law and \\·e respeetfully urge that it be affirmed.
Respedfully snbrni tted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attornc•y General
"Thf. REED HlTNTT:DR
Assistant Attorne:- General

Attorneys for Defendant
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